3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
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South in general had the most loyal feeling toward a government which had been benevolently generous to them. A blend of the two might have been fruitful.

It was not any want of patriotism that caused Boyer to miss his great opportunity but rather a defect of ability. Desiring, like Pétion, to lead rather than to drive his people, he nevertheless lacked even more than his former chief the force of personality which might have persuaded them to work hard for the greater glory of Haiti. Despising the brutal compulsion exercised by Dessalines and Christophe, which he regarded as savage and too closely resembling the earlier methods of slave owners; wishing to emulate solely the gentleness of his predecessor, Boyer hoped for a number of years that his people would become industrious of their own accord. His hopes were frustrated. During his twenty-five-year presidency the mass of Haitians became so indifferent to pecuniary inducements that little work could be got from them beyond that required to produce necessary food. As commerce declined, the President was driven to fresh issues of debased currency and to the opening of mines in different parts of the country, though he knew that the richest mine Haiti possessed was its still fertile soil.

For the first seven years Boyer pursued a policy based on hopeful expectation, refusing to inaugurate any of the forceful measures of his black predecessors. But by 1823 the treasury, enriched though it had been by the surplus from Christophe's exchequer, was empty; in 1824 disbursements exceeded income. Convinced in 1825 that his *laissez-faire* policy was failing to produce results, he decided to heed the insistent counsel of those (including most of the aristocratic, landholding class) who advised the reëstablishment of a coercive system of agriculture. His officials showed him that nowhere in the country were sugar plantations any longer being cultivated on a great scale—except for a few estates run by government officials who could command the forced labor of convicts. The policy of offering cultivators a fourth of the total crop of a plantation as wages was luring practically no laborers to work.[37] Even the few owners who offered the fourth plus daily wages had no success. Quite simply, the average Haitian preferred to be his own master, working only when he wished, and particularly working only for himself and his family.

37. This fourth in wages must not be confused with the quarter in taxes abolished by Pétion. See page 46 for a discussion of the quarter-crop wage system.

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175 657 [652] Boyer carried on Pétion's policy of no taxation. It was not until the American Occupation that Haitians could be said to be taxed. Ninety per cent of the state's income between 1900 and 1915 regularly came from tariffs, and only ten per cent from internal taxes. Even the efforts of the Americans, resulting in the laws of 1924 and 1928, were on the whole restricted to a few excise taxes. A land tax was hopeless, due to the utter confusion of titles and the stubborn impassivity of peasant squatters.[5]

2. *Monetary Policy of Pétion and Boyer*

175 652 The monetary situation in Haiti was chaotic in its early days. The gold money of France, Spain, England, and the United States circulated, as did small French coins, and the coins and paper money created by the Haitian rulers, who had complete control over money. For example, Pétion decreed[6] an increase in the value of the *gourde d'Espagne* from 8 livres 5 sols, to 9 livres; of the French *écu* of 6 francs from 9 livres to 9 livres 15 sols; and the 5 franc écu from 7 livres 10 sols to 8 livres 5 sols; this almost doubled the value of money in circulation. He also struck small coins to replace the pieces of 30, 24, 15, 12, and 6 sols of France. His small coins were merely token money.[7] The paper currency created by Pétion and so easily counterfeited has been mentioned.

[433] Boyer was continually in financial perplexities. Production was declining while expenditures had to be radically increased on account of the settlement with France in 1825. Boyer's budget was not a large one judged by modern standards, the average expenditure each year being about $5,000,000. To meet this, customs duties on imports and exports brought in about $2,200,000 annually; territorial duties on produce, houses, patents or licenses, market fees, and the like, a similar sum; but some half-million dollars had to be borrowed each year. The government [316] hoped to get something from developing mines in the Spanish part of the island, [425] but this hope failed. It was thought also that the sale of government lands might bring in some revenue, but few people wanted to invest money, when they had it, [454] in land, with agricultural affairs developing as they were and no way of making [465] people work: investment in trade was more promising. The national treasury was so empty that both the civil and military officials were poorly paid. It was fre- [661] quently said that almost all administrators and persons in authority were open to bribery. Meantime the number of civil servants was increasing: there was a swarm [647] of hirelings and subalterns in every commune, like a host of vampires. By their lack of honesty, conscientiousness, and efficiency, immense sums were lost annually to the treasury.

5. See the *Report of the American High Commissioner* (1929), p. 19.

6. May 4, 1808.

7. *Pétion voyant s'échapper de ses États les gourdes qu'effrayaient ses démêlés avec Christophe, eut pour les retenir l'ingénieuse idée d'y pratiquer une trouée. Ce moyen était trop efficace pour ne pas réussir, et il était trop simple pour que l'emploi n'en fut pas généralisé au moins par un équivalent. Ainsi, lorsqu'il en vint à battre monnaie, le chef de l'état du Sud descendit le titre de sa gourde à peu près au titre de la gourde espagnole tarée par son emporte-pièce. Il lui donne 858 millièmes de fin.*" Lepelletier de Saint-Remy, *Saint-Domingue*, II, 194.